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The EU-Russia-US Triangle 
Michael Emerson 
 
1. Stylising the triangle 
All configurations of the EU-Russia-US triangle 
merit examination, in the evolving relationships 
between the three parties. Beyond the three 
bilateral relationships and a cooperative trilateral 
there can be three special bilateral alliances, whose 
subject of interest would be the third party.  
•  Three ‘pure’ bilaterals 
o  EU-Russia 
o  EU-US 
o  Russia-US 
•  Cooperative trilateral 
•  Three bilateral alliances, where the third 
party is the subject of interest  
o  EU-US alliance vis-à-vis Russia 
o  EU-Russia alliance vis-à-vis the US 
o  Russia-US alliance vis-à-vis the EU 
Let us put a bit of flesh and blood on this 
taxonomic skeleton. 
Almost immediately after the end of the Soviet 
Union, the EU-Russia bilateral agenda became 
substantial and extensive, at least compared to 
the zero regime with the Soviet Union, and the 
present paper will give most attention to this. 
However there is still a search process going on 
to work out what this relationship is really to 
become, with some grand but vague ideas 
floating around such as for a number of common 
European policy spaces, or Bolshaya Evropa (la 
Grande Europe), without these taking real shape 
as of now. 
The EU-US bilateral, while complex and growing 
in importance, is still quite thin compared to the 
individual bilaterals between the EU member 
states and the US. Indeed treating the EU itself as a 
bloc is only partly valid. The most important 
transatlantic cooperation has been embedded 
multilaterally, be it in the WTO for trade, and 
NATO for strategic security. The larger part of the 
EU-US agenda now seems to be over how to act in 
relation to the rest of the world. 
The Russia-US bilateral also has a widening agenda, 
for example for energy, whereas the core of this 
bilateral used to be in strategic arms limitation and nuclear 
proliferation concerns.  
A cooperative concept between all three parties is 
represented by the G8 process, and can be manifest in the 
three parties cooperating in the UN Security Council. It is 
also represented by the OSCE, which however seems to be 
a half dead organization these days.  
The sensitive part of our story lies in the set of three 
possible bilateral alliances, whose purpose is defined in 
relation to the third party, i.e. to ally in order push, 
persuade or constrain the third party into a position 
advocated by the two allies.  
Of course the EU-US alliance to constrain Russia is now 
only a pale shadow of the Cold War of the Soviet period. 
However the semantics and mind-set of the Cold War keep 
on surfacing still in a mild way, notably over the post-
Soviet space, called its near abroad by Russia. Russia’s 
efforts to reassert a dominating position there stimulates the 
EU-US alliance in return, as seen in the last year over 
Moldova and Georgia. 
An EU-Russian alliance to constrain the US was until 
recently an empty category, and even an unthinkable one 
for many diplomats. However President Bush has gone a 
long way towards changing this through his initially 
strident unilateralism, then his decision to go to war in Iraq 
and more recently the conduct of the war. Of course the EU 
itself was deeply divided over Iraq and had no formal 
position at all. But this has been changing as events have 
unfolded, with France and Germany’s alliance with Russia 
in the UN gaining increasing support in the EU (most 
dramatically with Zapatero’s defection from the Iraq 
coalition), backed by a united public opinion (with the UK 
here included).  
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A Russian-US alliance to constrain the EU remains a 
virtually empty category so far, because the EU does 
nothing much that unifies the other two in opposition to it. 
However there have been some hints in this direction, like 
the way in which Presidents Bush and Putin have made 
common cause over the war on terror, to the point of 
agreeing to equate Chechnya and al-Qaeda at the level of 
public discourse. Implicitly this was, for Putin, to constrain 
criticism of Russia over Chechnya in international public 
opinion led by the EU. But the Iraq story has prevented a 
clear logic emerging here. 
The scene is now set for the bulk of this paper, which 
focuses first of the EU-Russia bilateral. It then takes up 
issues of the increasingly ‘variable geometry’ of the 
triangular relationship. It is discussed whether we may be 
seeing the emergence of a new self-equilibrating implicit 
system among these three main western partners.   
2. The EU-Russia bilateral 
Russia and the EU talk in their summit communiqués about 
their strategic partnership, but it seems more like an 
awkward partnership. The relationship is not that bad, 
certainly not life threatening. But it is not that good either.  
There is the inevitability of a complex relationship, given 
proximity and massive complementarity in trade, yet there 
are huge differences in how the two parties view Europe 
and the world, and how they behave internationally.  
The complementarity factor in trade and life style services 
is a bedrock that binds both parties into a stable relationship 
at a primary level. Russia exports oil, gas and other energy 
intensive materials, which the EU buys in exchange for 
smart manufactured goods, holidays and secondary 
residences in the sun for the new Russian middle classes. 
Young Russians want a normal place in the modern world, 
both Western and European. All of this is positive, 
fundamental and durable. It makes a huge change for the 
better after the dreary decades of ideological hostilities and 
deadly strategic security threats.  
As foreign policy actors the pair are totally different 
animals. The EU is a vegetarian elephant, Russia the bear 
that still cannot resist at times growling out of bad humour, 
and intimidating smaller neighbours. Russia has lost much 
of its former empire, yet with growing self-confidence and 
oil wealth it tries to regain ground. The EU sees its quasi 
empire growing, almost out of control. The EU is seen as 
normatively attractive in international relations, but is still 
more of a framework organisation than a foreign policy 
actor, and still lacking in discipline as a single force. Russia 
under Putin has become a much more coherent presence in 
international relations after the chaotic Yeltsin period, yet it 
often lacks normative attractiveness for its neighbours. The 
overlapping ‘near abroads’ become an increasingly delicate 
matter. The EU’s new European Neighbourhood Policy 
targets Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus 
states. Turkey, whose EU candidacy now becomes a major 
agenda item, regards both the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia as its near abroad.   
The European Commission published in February 2004 a 
remarkably frank document on the state of the EU-Russian 
relationship, containing much internal self-criticism of the 
EU as well as complaints directed at Russia
1. For its part 
Russia has focused on a list of fourteen complaints in 
relation to EU enlargement.   
The EU’s self-criticisms. The recent Commission 
document comes in the aftermath of Berlusconi’s EU 
presidency at the summit with Russia in November 2003, 
which was hugely embarrassing. Berlusconi improvised, 
clowning at the press conference as Putin’s self-appointed 
advocate, clearing him of any criticism over either 
Chechnya or the Khodorkovsky affair. Earlier Berlusconi 
had been making speeches advocating Russia’s accession to 
the EU. But for the rest of the EU this was no joke, either 
on form or substance. On form the EU was revealing its 
incoherence at top political level, coming after the searing 
split over Iraq earlier in the year. On substance there was an 
apparent erosion of the EU’s priority attachment to 
fundamental political values. 
Even leaving aside the ephemeral frivolities of the 
Berlusconi presidency there is apparently for President 
Putin a problem of understanding how the EU works. The 
story is told of a fairly recent meeting between Putin and 
the leader of a small EU state that has traditionally a strong 
relationship of trust with Russia. At this bilateral meeting 
Putin asked why was it that he found the EU institutions so 
difficult to deal with, compared to his bilateral relationships 
with many EU leaders. The reply was that Putin should not 
be surprised, since the member state leaders were so often 
inclined to make vague and friendly promises for things for 
which they no longer had competence at the bilateral level 
(e.g. visas and trade).  
The Commission’s document spoke about the need to 
“clearly draw ‘red lines’ for the EU, positions beyond 
which the EU will not go”. Various other phrases repeated 
the same idea: e.g. “to discuss frankly Russian practices 
that run counter to universal and European values”, “the 
need for increased coordination and coherence across all 
areas of EU activity – sending clear, unambiguous 
messages to Russia”.   
The self-criticisms are all the more justified, since over 
Russia there is a basic commonality of interest among the 
member states of the EU. The chances of the EU improving 
the coherence of its policy over Russia should therefore be 
quite good, and the institutional improvements of the 
proposed constitution, with appointment of an EU foreign 
minister, could be especially useful, given the latent unity 
of EU interests.  
Moscow’s policy. What is Russia’s foreign policy, in 
particular towards Europe? The official answer of former 
Foreign Minister Ivanov was to stress the objective of 
creating a genuinely strategic partnership, which should not 
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European Parliament on relations with Russia’, 
COM(2004)106, 9 February 2004 available at 
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be impaired by various outstanding problems, nor divert 
attention from the long-term strategic objectives.  
Independent analysts have the task of decoding or 
commenting on these official positions, which is done from 
a Russian standpoint by Dmitri Trenin (see extracts from 
his recent article quoted in Box 1). Trenin sees a form of 
21
st century Realpolitik, rather than a values-driven 
strategy, and a foreseeable concentration of effort on the 
near abroad (‘Operation CIS’), which in his view will mean 
growing competition with the European Union. For the US 
the system will be one of ‘limited partnership and local 
rivalry’.  
Box 1. Remarks by Dmitri Trenin on Moscow’s Realpolitik 
Relations with the West not an ideological imperative, but an 
external resource for economic modernization. 
Elite thinks in terms of a 21st century Realpolitik as a 
combination of geopolitics and geoeconomics with military 
might thrown in for good measure. Ideological preferences of 
governments and values of societies do not play a decisive 
role. 
‘Integration’ implies promoting contacts with the international 
community in general, not absorption by one part of it. 
Membership of the European Union is out of the question. 
Russian-European relations are mostly restricted to trade and 
economic contacts and political debates over human rights and 
civil liberties. 
The Kremlin has made up its mind with regard to the United 
States: limited partnership and local rivalry. 
Russia accepts the need for self-restriction and concentration 
on vital interests. The major objective in the near future will 
come down to rearranging post-Soviet territory and 
establishing a center of power under Russia's aegis. This new 
strategy may be called ‘Operation CIS’. 
Expansion of Russian capital into the former Soviet republics 
and Russia's transformation into an economic magnet as major 
factor in establishing the new center of power. Establishing a 
common economic zone and a regional security framework 
with some former Soviet republics as a strategy for the next 
20-25 years.  
All CIS countries will retain their sovereignty (Belarus maybe 
the exception). Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and countries of 
the southern Caucasus are "nearby foreign countries" for the 
European Union. Russia's active policy in the CIS will result in 
direct rivalry with the European Union over the future of these 
countries. 
Establishing a Russian centre of power will mean some serious 
sorting out of issues with the United States and the European 
Union. It will not be easy, but Russian leaders must prevent a 
confrontation with the West at all costs. Russia itself should be 
Russia's number one concern in the 21st century. That means 
modernization of Russia”.  
Source: Extracts from article in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 
February 2004, full English translation available at 
www.carnegie.ru. 
Russian deputy foreign minister V.A. Chizhov, in a speech 
at a conference about the Wider Europe, is consistent in 
combining these two elements in Russian foreign policy, 
namely a strategic bilateral partnership with the EU and 
Russia’s objective for re-integration of the CIS area
2. He 
goes on to criticise the EU’s Wider Europe policy, which is 
seeking to deepen the EU’s relationship with Ukraine and 
Moldova. He is therefore confirming Trenin’s point about a 
competition in the overlapping near abroads.  
Ivan D. Ivanov, former Deputy Foreign Minister, has 
provided another succinct but maybe classic statement of 
Russia’s view of itself as a Great Power, and why this 
limits the perspectives for its relations with the EU (see 
Box 2).  
Box 2. Ivan. D. Ivanov on Russia in Europe 
“Our country is not in need of affiliation with the EU. This 
would entail loss of its unique Euro-Asian specifics, the role of 
the center of attraction of the re-integration of the CIS, 
independence in foreign economic and defense policies, and 
complete restructuring (once more) of all Russian statehood 
based on the requirements of the European Union. Finally, 
great powers (and it is too soon to abandon calling ourselves 
such) do not dissolve in integration unions – they create them 
around themselves”. 
Source: Covremennaya Evropa,  Institut Ebropi, 2001. 
Partnership, cooperation and common European policy 
spaces. The official relations between the EU and Russia 
are governed by the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) signed by President Yeltsin in Corfu 
with EU leaders in June 1994. This provides for very wide-
ranging cooperation, especially in economic domains. 
An important institutional provision is the half-yearly 
summit meetings at the level of the President of Russia 
with the Presidents of the EU Council and Commission. A 
striking development under President Putin is that these 
meetings have become the occasion to set the agenda with 
important objectives and review work in progress, 
compared to the earlier meetings with Yeltsin, which were 
insubstantial. 
One ambitious idea in the PCA was to envisage free trade 
between the EU and Russia, but this is not taken seriously 
by either party for the time being, and is subordinated in 
any case to prior accession of Russia to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). After years of negotiations the 
European Commission and Russia made an agreement over 
the terms of Russia’s accession in May 2004 (Box 3). 
These negotiations threw up three major issues. First is the 
level of Russian import tariffs that become binding upon 
WTO accession, with an average of 7.6% for industrial 
products. Second are rules for some key service sectors 
(notably banking), where the level of agreement seems 
fuzzy still. Third is the level of domestic energy prices in 
Russia, especially for industrial uses of gas, where it was 
agreed that the price should be doubled from by 2010, 
while remaining substantially lower than the world market 
price. The agreement so far is only a bilateral 
understanding between the EU and Russia, with other 
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major trade partners still to have their say, before a 
multilateral agreement can be finalised with the WTO as a 
whole.  
Box 3. Agreement on EU’s conditions for Russia’s accession to 
the WTO 
Signed by Commissioner Pascal Lamy and Economics 
Minister German Gref, 21 May 2004. 
The average tariff level will not exceed 7.6% for industrial 
goods, 11% for fisheries, and 13 % for agricultural products.  
Russian gas prices to industrial users would be increased from 
the current $27-28 to between $37-42 by 2006 and $49-57 by 
2010.  
In services Russia will be taking commitments in a large range 
of sectors including telecommunications, transport, financial 
services, postal and courier, construction, distribution, 
environmental, news agency and tourism.  
Source: European Commission, www.europa.eu.int/comm/ 
trade/issues/bilateral/countries/Russia/pr210504_en.htm 
The domestic energy price issue in particular touches a very 
raw nerve in Russian politics. Russia argues that natural gas 
is a natural comparative advantage, just as is the sun for 
tourism in the Mediterranean. The argument has become 
very heated in Russian political circles, even to the point 
that the EU has been accused of wanting to cause social and 
political chaos in Russia. The argument of the economist is 
that this very low gas price keeps the Russian economy 
stuck with a structure of energy wasting and obsolete 
industrial technologies. It is also contributing to global 
warming, which the Kyoto protocol is intended to curb. 
With the Bush administration having already pulled the US 
out of Kyoto, Russian ratification became a necessary 
condition for Kyoto to enter into legally binding force. In 
May, after a period of open disagreements in Moscow, 
President Putin said that Russia does intend to ratify.  
The EU and Russia have pursued many more issues in their 
energy dialogue since its inception at their Paris summit in 
October 2000. There has been one significant 
disappointment, with Russia declining in December 2003 to 
ratify the European Energy Charter’ transit protocol, on the 
grounds that the European Commission had been trying to 
transfer the issue into the WTO legal environment. The 
transit protocol would introduce multilateral regulation of 
the gas and oil pipeline business, which is especially 
pertinent for complex cases where major pipelines cross 
many frontiers. Within Russia there are manifest 
differences of interest between Gazprom, which has been 
against this multilateral legal order since it would restrict its 
monopolistic position, and other energy sector interests that 
favour it. It is possible that the Russian side stands to lose 
most from a sub-optimal regime, failing to digest the fact 
that the economics and technology of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) transport are improving fast, which means that the 
monopolistic position of Gazprom is eroding. For example 
possible investments by European companies in major 
Iranian offshore deposits are being considered, which 
would be based on LNG delivery systems. More generally 
the world natural gas market is becoming more competitive 
and fluid. The EU also seeks Russian agreement for its 
pipeline system to be open for the transit of, for example 
gas from Kazakhstan, with direct dealings between buyer 
and seller. Here too President Putin has been somewhat 
conciliatory with the EU, saying that while the state will 
keep its control over the gas network, it will open it to other 
users (e.g. Kazakhstan). But these semi-agreements do not 
yet have precise and legally binding form. The Russian side 
may be criticised for yielding to short-sighted Gazprom 
lobbying
3, and the EU side not trying hard enough to use 
the potential of the multilateral Energy Charter framework
4.   
A second summit initiative in May 2001 was to launch the 
idea of a ‘Common European Economic Space’ (CEES). 
The purpose of this seems to have been to find ways of 
preparing for deeper market integration pending resolution 
of the WTO accession negotiations. The two parties set up 
a high level group to produce a concept document, which 
they delivered in December 2003. But this turns out to be 
still a very sketchy contribution, without immediate 
operational implications. It did nothing to dissolve the 
mounting terminological and conceptual confusion in 
relation to the existing European Economic Area (EEA) 
that joins Norway and other EFTA states with the EU, or 
political confusion and potential contradiction with the 
Single Economic Space (SES), which Russia launched with 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine at Yalta in mid-2003.    
However the two parties seem still encouraged by the idea 
of creating further common policy spaces, and at St 
Petersburg in May 2003 they announced at summit level 
their commitment to developing three more spaces.  
The first of these, for education, research and culture, has 
some substance already with Russian participation in 
existing EU-funded programmes, and surely deserves 
sustained support.  
The second, for justice and home affairs, certainly also 
deserves a long-term effort, which is already engaged on 
matters of visas and readmission agreements. In the 
combating of organised crime the common interest of the 
EU and Russia to curb drugs is of huge importance, given 
that the production of opium in Afghanistan is now 
booming again. Heroin addiction is surely destroying many 
more lives in Europe than were lost on 11
th September in 
New York, and for these drug problems the whole of 
Europe is in the same boat, with little protection from any 
official borders.  
The third common space, for external security, seems 
devoid of substance so far, beyond the useful procedural 
initiative already decided at the Brussels summit in October 
2001 of having the Russian ambassador to the EU meet the 
Troika of the EU Political and Security Committee for 
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Winter 2004, at www.encharter.org.  
4 See remarks of Russian deputy prime minister Viktor 
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briefings each month. One might expect that this common 
space for external security would see the EU and Russia 
really cooperating over conflict resolution in near abroad 
cases such as Moldova and Georgia, but this is far from 
being the case. The summit commitment here seems to fall 
into the category of an empty political gesture.  
In 2002 Putin used the summit process to make a big push 
to get some results for Kaliningrad, before it became an EU 
enclave with Polish and Lithuanian accession. This 
delivered some results, with new procedures to facilitate 
transit of persons between Kaliningrad and mainland 
Russia, compared to the usual Schengen visa procedures
5. 
There was also launched a study to create a new high 
speed, non-stop train link between Kaliningrad and 
mainland Russia. However more ambitious ideas from the 
Russian side to make of Kaliningrad a ‘pilot region’ for 
Russia’s integration with the EU have not really advanced, 
either conceptually or in practice. 
A continuing Russian priority is to enhance the 
institutionalisation of its relationship with the EU, 
alongside analogous developments with NATO, which has 
its 19+1 forum. The November 2003 summit decided to 
establish a Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), and this 
began in practice in April 2004 when President Prodi went 
to Moscow with five colleagues, members of the 
Commission responsible for trade, energy, transport, 
education, research and justice and home affairs: this was a 
very different and much more plausible 6+6 format, 
compared to the 25+1 requested by Russia. The EU side 
has been puzzled by the apparent Russian preference for 
such an unwieldy 25+1 format, which seems to be 
motivated by the desire to be having a dialogue ‘within’ the 
EU rather than ‘with’ it, and also represents a residual lack 
of understanding of how the EU functions.  
EU enlargement. Russia devoted a lot of political energy in 
the last year to complaining over the unfavourable impact 
on it of EU enlargement. The list of 14 complaints were 
mostly trade policy consequences of enlargement. Russia 
sought to reinforce its arguments with the threat not to 
agree to the extension of the PCA to the enlarged EU, 
which the EU itself considered to be an automatic matter. If 
the PCA were not thus extended there would be a legal void 
in the basis for EU-Russian relations. Apart from making 
for a bad political atmosphere, this would have caused 
discontinuity in the half-yearly summit process and 
conceivably of some asymmetric trade preferences granted 
by the EU to Russia. On balance this bargaining stance 
seems not to have been too well conceived. It led to the EU 
foreign ministers on 23 February to “emphasise that the 
PCA has to be applied to the EU-25 without pre-condition 
or distinction by 1 May 2004. To do so would avoid a 
serious impact on EU-Russia relations in general”. … “The 
EU is open to discuss any of Russia’s legitimate concerns 
over the impact of enlargement, but this shall remain 
                                                 
5 See Evgeny Vinokurov, “Kaliningrad’s Borders and Transit 
to Mainland Russia - Practicalities and Remaining 
Bottlenecks”,  CEPS Commentary, February 2004, at 
www.ceps.be.  
entirely separate from PCA extension”.
6 Russia’s tactics 
were seen as bluffing. By May the two sides had sorted out 
the issues, and the PCA extension was duly signed.  
Included in the list of Russian complaints is the situation of 
Russia-speaking communities in Latvia and Estonia, which 
are matters of member state rather than EU competence, 
and not directly affected by the enlargement process. 
Nonetheless the recent revision of the education-language 
law in Latvia has been generating a lot of tension, first of 
all in Latvia itself. There has been a worrying instability in 
the Latvian parliament’s handling of this question, with 
extreme nationalist elements passing a very restrictive 
language law. Russian protests were in this case politically 
understandable, and the law was revised in a second 
reading. So here Russia had a point, even if Russian 
parliamentarians themselves do not always speak 
respectfully of the independence of the Baltic States. What 
seems sure is that this is all a passing problem, since the 
Russian minorities of the Baltic States face a future full of 
opportunities, as long as they do their foreign language 
homework. They will become EU citizens and so have full 
access to the EU for travel, residence and employment, yet 
they will be able to return to Russia if they wish, or to 
engage in EU-Russian business opportunities, and enjoy 
double nationality as well if they wish (e.g. Estonian or 
Latvian and Russian). 
The Wider Europe. As the EU’s enlargement approached, 
the ‘new neighbours’ became increasingly concerned. As 
already described the Russian reaction was to complain 
about specific impacts on it and to seek a deeper strategic 
partnership. However the other neighbours have responded 
in a quite different way, instead demanding the 
‘perspective’ of long-term EU membership. This is most 
explicit in the cases of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and 
Armenia.  
In reply the EU has offered now the outline of a European 
Neighbourhood Policy
7, offering the perspective of 
increasing integration in many details, but excluding the 
perspective of full membership. The EU by its statutes 
recognises the eligibility of all European democracies to 
become member states. Yet it does not want to provoke 
more accession candidacies, since the task of digesting the 
move from 15 to 25 looks formidable. The EU is actually 
divided on the question of further enlargements, but the 
next real test case is going to be Turkey, not Ukraine.  
However the strategic messages are getting highly 
confusing. The incentive effect of the new neighbourhood 
policy is seriously blunted by the refusal of the magic 
words ‘perspective of EU membership’ even in the long 
term. This could lead to unintended effects in relation to 
both Ukraine, where the alternative of a deeper re-
integration with Russia is a political option, and Moldova 
                                                 
6 Conclusions of the Foreign Ministers’ Council, 23 February 
2004, 6294/04 (Presse 49).  
7 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – 
Strategy Paper’, 12 May 2004. 
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after Romania’s accession in a few years time, when the 
idea of Romanian-Moldovan re-unification might be re-
ignited as the only way into Europe.   
The EU and Russia are agreeing in principle to create 
several ‘common European policy spaces’, notably for 
economics, education and research, justice and home affairs 
and external security. This sounds like excellent building 
blocks for an all-inclusive Wider Europe policy that would 
minimise the new divisions of Europe between the 
enlarging EU and its neighbours. Yet if the EU-Russian 
common policy spaces are to become substantial they will 
necessarily have to tackle the issue of coherence with the 
relationships with the countries that lie in between them. 
This is patently obvious for such matters as transport and 
energy infrastructures, trade and market policies, any 
ambitious regime for the movement of persons and 
anything concerning common external security threats.  
If one wanted to be serious about these common European 
policy spaces, it is not that difficult to design a framework 
for doing so. The elements are half assembled already, but 
not yet properly put together
8. A total of seven common 
policy spaces is conceivable for (1) democracy and human 
rights, (2) education, research and culture, (3) trade and 
market policies, (4) macroeconomic and monetary affairs, 
(5) economic infrastructures and networks, (6) justice and 
home affairs, and (7) external security. There is a plethora 
of multilateral organisations concerned with this or that 
element, including the Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO, 
EBRD and several regional initiatives of direct interest to 
Russia (for the Baltic, Barents and Black seas). The 
essential question is whether there could be a political will 
to invest more seriously in a Wider Europe of common 
multilateral institutions, based on common political values 
and ground rules.  
If Russia became a willing partner for such an endeavour it 
would mean giving some substance at last to the old ideas 
of Gorbachev for a Common European Home, or of 
Mitterrand for a European Confederation. There is indeed 
no shortage of noble language for strategic discourse on the 
Pan-European space (Bolshaya Evropa, la Grande Europe, 
European Confederation, Greater Europe, Pan-Europe
9). 
But first and foremost would be the questions of strategic 
choice:  
•  Whether Russia is to continue trying first of all to 
consolidate the European CIS space, combined then 
with a bilateral duopoly with the enlarged EU over a 
Europe neatly divided into two quasi empires.  
•  Whether Russia will be able and willing to converge 
faster and more convincingly on Europe’s basic 
political norms and values with a sustained 
performance translating into reputation. 
                                                 
8 As is proposed in some detail in M. Emerson, ‘The Wider 
Europe Matrix’, CEPS, 2004.  
9 See the remarkable book of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
‘Pan-Europe’, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1926, which 
deserves to be reprinted.  
•  Whether the EU would be willing to go beyond its very 
limited ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ to invest in a 
much more substantial Greater Europe concept 
bringing together the enlarging EU and all the 
European states of the CIS. 
For the time being the time does not yet seem ripe for a 
Greater Europe initiative, which may have to wait at least 
another five or ten years for new political conditions. We 
have to hope that in the meantime the awkward partnership 
proves reasonably manageable, which it is more likely than 
not to be.  
3. Variable geometry in the EU-Russia-US 
triangle 
The idea of variable geometry around the EU-Russia-US 
triangle, with alternating diplomatic alliances at different 
times and on different topics, need not be viewed as a 
conflictual system. Moreover it would not be a system at all 
in any formal sense. It would more resemble how the EU is 
working all the time, where there are shifting patterns of 
alliances on particular issues under negotiation. The 
diplomacy of organising and deploying alliances is done 
within an understood framework of rules and militarily 
entirely non-threatening behaviour. The implicit system 
would be revealed only in practice through various 
episodes, in which any one of the parties that got seriously 
out of line would be faced with costly diplomatic isolation.  
Whether or when the US might be responsive to pressure 
coming from the other two is of course an issue. An 
interesting counterfactual case over Iraq could be to 
suppose that Blair had not immediately sided with the 
Bush, but sought to coordinate his position first with his EU 
partners. One can speculate that Blair, with hindsight, today 
regrets not having done that. If the EU had adopted a 
common line behind the French-German-Russian-Chinese 
position in the Security Council, favouring more time for 
the inspectors, would the US have gone ahead entirely on 
its own? Maybe yes, maybe no. What seems now sure, 
however, with the benefit of hindsight, is that the US would 
have run into difficulties even faster with no coalition 
allies. The rubbishing of the extreme neo-con argument that 
the US needs no allies would have come even faster. 
The appeal of the implicit variable geometry system lies in 
the fact that the three parties all share important interests 
together, but are not perfect matches in any one of the three 
bilaterals. The EU and the US share history and joint 
sponsorship of fundamental political values of democracy 
and human rights. However they diverge also 
fundamentally on the extent to which they are willing to 
share sovereignty in multilateral structures, with the US 
remaining a quintessential modern state, whereas the EU 
has become post-modern. The EU and Russia share a 
continental land mass and ‘Europeanness’, with 
complementary trading interests, and gradually converging 
political values. However Russia also, like the US, has 
hardly moved at all in the direction of sharing sovereignty 
with multilateral organisations, beyond thin commitments 
to weak organisations. Russia and the US share strategic THE EU-RUSSIA-US TRIANGLE | 7 
 
security concerns over weapons of mass destruction, and 
geo-political concerns, such as over the future of China. 
But the relationship is too imbalanced to be very close.  
It would of course be a major development for the EU to 
regard Russia and the US as joint partners in the implicit 
system, ratifying the end of the Cold War period. It has 
taken the current episode of US foreign policy, criticised 
more widely and strongly than at any other time in living 
memory, for the new implicit system to take shape. This 
may be painful for old transatlantic friends to face up to. 
The 60
th anniversary of D-Day was not only deeply moving 
for its historical significance. But it also, by contrast, 
highlighted the depth to which the relationship has dropped. 
Already before 9/11 President Bush’s position over Kyoto, 
the International Criminal Court and the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict sent out disturbing messages. However it was his 
war over Iraq that has been devastating for America’s 
reputation worldwide, both ex-ante over the moral 
justification for the war, and ex-post for the way it has 
turned out. This was first documented in opinion polls a 
year ago, when the Eurobarometer reported that the US and 
Israel are regarded in Europe as being among the top five 
nations as dangers to world peace, joining thus with Bush’s 
own ‘axis of evil’. It is seen now in a non-stop flow of op. 
ed. pieces by respected analysts in serious European media. 
A reply to the question whether the EU will be a strong 
partner for the US could today be along the lines of 
Lawrence Freedman’s recent article: “Already in Spain and 
potentially soon in Australia and Italy, as well as Britain, 
guilt by association with the US has become a real electoral 
liability”
10. The strong partner question, that has long been 
pertinent, has now for the time being become even 
impertinent. 
What is not clear is how different a President Kerry would 
be, beyond matters of style and articulation. Commentators 
from the US are warning Europeans not to expect a radical 
change, especially if it were Richard Holbrooke to replace 
Colin Powell at the State Department. According to this 
argument the problem is not Bush, but a deeper matter of 
US political and strategic culture, with a projection of 
Americanisation internationally that is insensitive to other 
cultures and distortingly over-militarised in its instruments 
of action. But even according to this view the current saga 
over Iraq could lead to a sobering up of US diplomacy for 
the next period (5 or 10 years or more?), with the most 
egregious neo-cons wiped off the political scene. This does 
not exclude muscular US leadership. It only needs to be 
well articulated and to avoid plunging into big disasters to 
be respected in Europe. The turn around with fresh 
leadership could be immediate, even if a certain legacy of 
the Bush administration may last. In this context the 
variable geometry of the EU-Russia-US triangle looks like 
a quite plausible part of the implicit system, maybe with 
China coming into the process too at times, as began to 
appear in the UN over Iraq a year ago; and this is set to 
intensify as and when China is invited to accede to the G8. 
                                                 
10 Lawrence Freedman, “America’s battle to regain respect”, 
Financial Times, 31 May 2004. 
4. Conclusions 
The EU-Russia relationship has not yet settled down into 
some kind of steady state system. The two parties are 
spending a lot of time pretending through their summit 
communiqués to be strategic partners. However their grand 
projects for common European policy spaces do not yet 
translate into important realities and even grander ideas 
about the Bolshaya Evropa or la Grande Europe are just 
vague talk.  
Their strategic interests are not yet convergent. Russia 
wants to consolidate the European CIS space, and then 
have a neat Europe in which the enlarged EU and the 
Russian led space would be mutually exclusive, and the EU 
and Russia would manage the big Europe as an ordered 
duopoly. The EU does not support this idea, yet for its part 
is caught up on a dilemma of its own making. It wants to 
see all of Europe converge on its conception of European 
political values and economic norms, but without offering 
membership perspectives to the outer periphery of 
European CIS states, although all except Russia and 
Belarus are asking for this. The EU’s new neighbourhood 
policy is therefore not convincing. A stronger 
neighbourhood policy could be devised, but the EU is not 
ready to attempt this.  
The EU-Russia-US trio progress towards a more mature 
post-Cold War system. The three bilateral relationships are, 
with limitations, all substantial, complementing various 
multilateral arrangements, with the G8 at its peak. However 
the foreign policy of the Bush administration causes the 
system develop a further dimension. We call this an 
implicit system of variable alliances between any two of the 
three parties, when the third party gets seriously out of line 
with the interests of the other two. Up until recently the 
presumption was that the US-EU alliance would be the 
watchdog to keep post-Soviet Russia in order, but the Bush 
administration has brought into play the perspective of 
Europe as a whole, including Russia, uniting to try and 
keep the US in order. The Iraq episode initially saw the 
schism between so-called old and new Europe, but this is 
fading into a more united Europe as time goes on. The 
point seems to be that the US needs allies too, contrary to a 
passing view to the contrary on the part of the neo-cons. 
When this is sufficiently digested, there will be no need for 
an EU-Russian alliance to have to try to constrain the US, 
and by this time either the EU or Russia may have got 
seriously out of line through their own policies, and would 
be similarly opposed by the other two. The implicit system 
could be self-equilibrating. C  E 
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